Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.2.7

If God loves a human being with the love of attachment. If God so loves every human being equally and permanently . . . then natural human rights are firmly grounded. Two big “ifs;” how does Wolterstorff account for them?

He doesn’t: “My argument has been hypothetical. . . . I have not argued that God does in fact so love every creature who bears the imago dei.” Well then, what’s Wolterstorff’s point? “I have argued that a grounding of natural human rights is available to the person who holds the theistic convictions indicated.” (360)

Not surprisingly, Wolterstorff himself holds these convictions but his failure to provide any account for them is surprising given his elaborately argued scriptural account for a rights-based understanding of biblical justice (see 1.2 of long ago and Justice at 65-95 and 109-31). In any event, his reticence at this point is disappointing. Many theists of various sorts, including Christian theists, hold Wolterstorff’s position. But at least some do not. Consider the following references to the official doctrinal statements of Christian churches in the Dutch, Reformed tradition: Belgic Confession Arts. 15, 16, and 37 (www.crcna.org/pages/belgic_confess_main.cfm) and the Canons of Dort 1.6, 1.7, 1.10, 1.15 (www.crcna.org/pages/dort_canons_main.cfm).

Perhaps I have misunderstood Wolterstorff. Perhaps the God’s love of attachment is consistent with his reprobation of a certain set of persons. But I don’t think Wolterstorff would agree for on the last page of Justice he writes that the Judaic and Christian heritage “declares that all of us have great and equal worth: the worth of being made in the image of God and of being loved redemptively by God.” (393, emphasis added) Here I take him to be saying that God’s redemptive love (presumably an aspect of his love of attachment) is universally deployed, a contention which strikes me as at odds with the resources cited above.

Perhaps I am still misunderstanding Wolterstorff. Perhaps there is a sense in which God’s love of attachment (including redemptive love) is consistent with God’s reprobation of some. If there is, it isn’t readily apparent to me and if that’s Wolterstorff’s contention I certainly wish he’d suggested an account for it.