Secularisms

"Secularism" has a variety of meanings. In America and India it means disestablishment. Both cultures are deeply religious in the sense of affect and expression although depth of conviction varies. Secularism is thus understood largely as creating the social space for pluriform constellations of belief and practice. By contrast, French laïcité tends toward toward exclusion of religious expression in the public sphere but not in private. Religious affections have dwindled in France but they certainly have not disappeared.

The public-private divide is generally problematic but marriage in particular represents an intersection of the two spheres. In America and India the great majority pf marriages are solemnized with religious ceremonies. In neither country is it required; it is a matter of choice--a liberal position one might think. Religious bodies in America, do, however, have the power to effect the legal aspects of marriage. The position of France is otherwise: no non-State entity has the authority to make the marriage relationship of legal significance.

But then one is not Sarah Beresford, lecturer in law at the University of Leicester. In her piece Seeking Secularism: Resisting Religiosity in Marriage and Divorce (available via SSRN here), Dr. Beresford argues that England and America should do more to "discourage religiosity in these spheres [marriage and divorce]." Relying on thin evidence and otherwise outdated sources, she perceives an alarming increase in religiosity in the UK and the US (obviously she hasn't kept up with my blogging on Christian Smith's Souls in Transition.) Her greatest concern seems to be the possibility of covenant marriage, which has been enacted in only two American states and has no prospects of spreading to more.

If there is little evidence of increasing religiosity in America (or the UK for that matter), and if covenant marriage turned out to be little more than a flash in the pan, what's really bugging Dr. Beresford?

Beresford opines that she is not so much concerned about public expressions of religion but private ones: "I would suggest that a decrease in both societal and individual religiosity is a desirable objective." Without much argument she asserts that "Church and religiosity should absent itself from those matters which are the proper remit of the State," which most certainly includes marriage. Why is marriage uniquely of State interest? Because "marriages generally and religious marriage in particular, disadvantage women and so women should be cautious about entering into the heterosexualised institution of marriage." Indeed, quoting herself Beresford reasserts that "heterosexual marriage is so imbued with a history of inequality and thus so fundamentally flawed, that it cannot be fixed by law reform and should therefore be abolished."

The short of it is that Beresford doesn't like marriage, thinks marriage is a bad idea, and advocates the abolition of any religious authority to effect marriage. So what?

Lots of scholars, pundits, and other folks agree with Beresford. Why should someone whose field is bankruptcy and commercial law bother to outline her argument?

It goes back to my discussion of the "two kingdoms" approach as a contemporary iteration of Reformed Christian political thought. (Check here, here, here, and last of all here for earlier comments on this topic.) One might expect two kingdoms proponents to be sympathetic with Beresford's position. If there are two hermetically separate kingdoms--the redemptive one of the Church--and the creation kingdom--dominated by the State--there indeed should be no overlap. Marriage by officiants of the Church should not, on a two-kingdoms account, have any legal significance. Secularism a la laïcité.

I'll be waiting to see if a position like Beresford's begins to make its rounds in this theological camp.