A new record: a two-word title with thirteen syllable. The first word, neuropsychological, is all the rage in law and morality. In brief, it's the latest version of biological determinism to come down the pike. Now that scientists can observe at great depth the neurological functions that accompany conscious and unconscious thought, and have been able to conduct experiments (so I understand) that demonstrate that the brain only retroactively creates reasons for the body's actions, the belief in free will (i.e., that at least sometimes we rationally choose an end and then will to accomplish it) must be illusory. A post here at The Economist explains the argument much more fully.
Such conclusions fail, like all purely naturalistic explanations, because they swallow themselves. In other words, why limits illusory beliefs to belief in free will? Seems self-servingly arbitrary. I can't think of a good reason why all beliefs (including the belief in free will) would not equally the result of post-hoc rationalizations of similarly unreasoned decisions. Of course, a belief that the belief that free will is illusory must also be illusory, a conclusion that strongly suggests that the entirety of neuropsychological determinism falls victim of the problem of infinite regress. (For a far more analytic discussion of the naturalistic fallacy generally see Alvin Plantinga's paper "Naturalism Defeated" here.)
But there's reason to believe that neuropsychology is onto something. How is it that human beings (and animals) are not blank slates? Why is it that we immediately draw certain inferences from perceptions and cannot be "reprogrammed" not to do so? Justin L. Barrett's book "Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief" (2012) tackles the specific question of the natural religious beliefs of children. Rather than working through Barrett's book, I'll quote from an excellent review by Stanton Jones (provost at Wheaton College) at the Books & Culture website here:
I'm not the person to summarize Plantinga's extraordinary work in epistemology; however, the late Dewey Hoitenga has done so in "Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga" (1991). Plantinga (along with many others) defines knowledge as justified true belief. Belief is a psychological state of affairs; obviously, one can believe in something that is not true. Yet all human beings with a properly functioning noetic capacity start with a set of foundational beliefs (e.g., belief in continuity of existence, the existence of other minds, the reality of a world external to oneself, etc.) Many other beliefs are thereafter formed based upon these foundational beliefs but it is the ability to justify such properly basic beliefs that turns them into knowledge.
Modern neuropsychology helps explain what beliefs are properly basic and how we come to have them. Epistemological foundationalism is therefore not merely a philosophical construct; it is consistent with the best of contemporary brain science. Turning such properly basic beliefs into knowledge still requires justification but so, one can rightfully claim, does their contrary. Indeed, the a-theologian has the more difficult challenge because he must justify the falsity of that which is properly basic, a challenge which, notwithstanding the rash of the "new atheists," is rarely even attempted.
Such conclusions fail, like all purely naturalistic explanations, because they swallow themselves. In other words, why limits illusory beliefs to belief in free will? Seems self-servingly arbitrary. I can't think of a good reason why all beliefs (including the belief in free will) would not equally the result of post-hoc rationalizations of similarly unreasoned decisions. Of course, a belief that the belief that free will is illusory must also be illusory, a conclusion that strongly suggests that the entirety of neuropsychological determinism falls victim of the problem of infinite regress. (For a far more analytic discussion of the naturalistic fallacy generally see Alvin Plantinga's paper "Naturalism Defeated" here.)
But there's reason to believe that neuropsychology is onto something. How is it that human beings (and animals) are not blank slates? Why is it that we immediately draw certain inferences from perceptions and cannot be "reprogrammed" not to do so? Justin L. Barrett's book "Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief" (2012) tackles the specific question of the natural religious beliefs of children. Rather than working through Barrett's book, I'll quote from an excellent review by Stanton Jones (provost at Wheaton College) at the Books & Culture website here:
Children over three begin to discern and attribute purpose to much of what happens around them, which they in turn are inclined to attribute to human and superhuman agents. When children are old enough to actually discuss their intuitive concepts of god(s), they seem normatively disposed to believe in a (or many) divine agent(s) possessing "superknowledge, superperception, creative power, and immortality," as well as to believe in a purposeful design to creation, in some sort of basic universal morality, and in the persistence of human identity after death.This does not, of course, prove that there is a god(s). It does suggest, however, why religious belief persists in the face of the pervasive secularism of much of the elite segments of Western society. It also provides a neurological perspective on another of Alvin Plantinga's philosophical insights, the "proper basicality" of belief in God.
I'm not the person to summarize Plantinga's extraordinary work in epistemology; however, the late Dewey Hoitenga has done so in "Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga" (1991). Plantinga (along with many others) defines knowledge as justified true belief. Belief is a psychological state of affairs; obviously, one can believe in something that is not true. Yet all human beings with a properly functioning noetic capacity start with a set of foundational beliefs (e.g., belief in continuity of existence, the existence of other minds, the reality of a world external to oneself, etc.) Many other beliefs are thereafter formed based upon these foundational beliefs but it is the ability to justify such properly basic beliefs that turns them into knowledge.
Modern neuropsychology helps explain what beliefs are properly basic and how we come to have them. Epistemological foundationalism is therefore not merely a philosophical construct; it is consistent with the best of contemporary brain science. Turning such properly basic beliefs into knowledge still requires justification but so, one can rightfully claim, does their contrary. Indeed, the a-theologian has the more difficult challenge because he must justify the falsity of that which is properly basic, a challenge which, notwithstanding the rash of the "new atheists," is rarely even attempted.
I was under the impression that Plantinga rejects the tradition understanding of knowledge as justified true belief and instead argues "that a belief is warranted, hence constitutes knowledge, only if formed from a properly functioning cognitive process or faculty" (see reliabilism in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
ReplyDeleteWorthy of a follow-up post.
ReplyDeleteAs fallen creatures, how much free will do we have? It's an old question, isn't it?
ReplyDelete