23 April 2009

Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.2.5

Wolterstorff doesn’t give up the quest for a Christian theistic account for human rights. Before I reconnoiter his proposed account, let’s recall something I wrote a few days ago (3.2.1): “If a right is what is required from another to show due respect for the worth of another human, it must be on account of (i) some property, (ii) some capacity, (iii) some activity, or (iv) some relationship.” Two and three went out the window in 3.2.2 (not all humans have meaningful capacities nor can everyone perform respect-worthy activities) and now Wolterstorff has found (i) wanting as well (by reducing the most plausible understandings of the property of “image of God” into capacity accounts). That leaves him to explore (iv): Is there “some worth-imparting relation of human beings to God that does not in any way involve a reference to human capacities”? (352)

Wolterstorff says there is and that relationship is one that should be familiar to classical economists: it is one of bestowed (or imputed) worth. All human beings are respect-worthy because God loves them.

Before proceeding further, let’s consider Wolterstorff’s example of bestowed worth on a human level, a treasured family relic of a deceased ancestor. Do such relics have instrumental value? Perhaps in some cases but surely the instrumental value of, say, a lock of hair of one’s great-grandmother is difficult to identify. Does such a relic have value because possession of it satisfies some desire on my party? To answer yes is merely to move the discussion one step back: why do I desire this lock of hair? Better, per Wolterstorff, is simply to say that “relics have the value of being such that by treasuring the relic, we honor the person of whom it is the relic.” (358) In other words, Wolterstorff is a classical, not a neo-classical, economist. While desire may create value, the worth of an object varies with its meaning or purpose in a moral and social universe. Worth is indeed imputed but the standard of imputation is not satisfaction of a subjective need or want. (If this doesn’t persuade you, consider applying the desire-fulfillment theory of value to God.)

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