I expect that my final post will be to direct folks to a new blog, one whose name doesn't lead people to think I'm still in India. Until then, I recommend listening to the full audio report by NPR reporter Daniel Zwerdling about a "chipati man" in Chandigarh, the capital of the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105359019). My mouth watered as I listended to his account of a roadside meal of dal, subzi, and chipati. The commentary on the rapid social and economic changes in India rang true, although they were less evident in Jodhpur than many other cities.
Showing posts with label Fulbright to India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fulbright to India. Show all posts
14 June 2009
28 May 2009
Better Late Than Never – Our Visit to Hong Kong
As amazing as it may seem to anyone who’s been there, Hong Kong was rather relaxing after our whirlwind of activity in Taiwan. Only one university visit, this one to Chinese University Hong Kong where I met Dr. Kin Shing Chan, professor of chemistry. I left Mei-Hsin to lecture to Dr. Chan’s class about American patent law while LaDonna and I got a guided tour of CUHK’s brand spanking new law school building. Its facilities were top-notch, as good as I’ve seen anywhere in the States. After only a few years of existence CUHK Law School already has the faculty to offer the full gamut of legal education: LL.B, J.D., LL.M., M.Phil., and Ph.D.
The rest of our time in Hong Kong was spent relaxing. Or were we relaxing by spending? Hong Kong is definitely a high-intensity place but possesses far more natural beauty than I had anticipated. Shopping, at least for those with the endurance to bargain with multiple vendors, can be fruitful. That new Nikkor lens came in handy at our daughter’s graduation from Virginia Tech.
Our departure planned for the 10th was put off by a day when our plane’s intercom system—which had worked fine on the first leg of its trip from Singapore—suddenly died. A night in the airport hotel while the system was repaired and then 20 hours in the air and O’Hare before landing in Norfolk. A long trip after a long time away (140 days if my math is right) but being home felt good.
Many, many thanks to the Fulbright program staff here and in India, to the folks at NLU and our many new friends in India and our even newer friends in the Far East. And thanks to the God whose providence brought us all together.
21 May 2009
"Why The Taliban Will Win in Pakistan"
For a gloomy but perceptive analysis read
http://www.livemint.com/2009/05/21211222/Why-the-Taliban8217s-going.html
The author may overstate his postion but American policymakers should understand the extent to which Pakistan has already enacted Shari'a law. Reports from Christian advocacy groups within Pakistan about the invidious use of blasphemy laws lends credence to the author's case.
14 May 2009
A Whirlwind in Taiwan
We made it from Hong Kong to Taipei without incident where we were met by our short-term colleague from Jodhpur, Mei-Hsin Wang (or Dr. Wang Mei-Hsin to be correct or simply Lily for the Chinese-name-pronunciation-challenged). Mei-Hsin took us to her flat where we relaxed for a couple of hours before traveling with her sister and brother-in-law to see Dan-Chaing University of the Arts where they both are on faculty. Mei-Hsin’s brother-in-law teaches set design and construction and was pleased to show us the university’s extensive facilities for the performing arts (multiply Regent’s Comm Building by two).
The next day took us back to the airport to pick up my NLU-Jodhpur colleague Seshan Radha, her husband (and professor of contracts and commercial transactions at NLU-Delhi) Amar Singh, and NLU-Delhi’s Vice-Chancellor Rambir Singh. We all hit the road to Touliu where we checked into a local hotel and then went to the Sword Lake Resort for an evening of shows and food to celebrate LaDonna’s birthday.
Monday morning we traveled by minibus to National Yunlin University where I spoke to 50 or so business students about negotiation skills and negotiating with Americans (from notes courtesy of Regent colleague Eric DeGroff). A quick lunch and then off to the Overseas Chinese Institute of Technology in Taichung where I talked to law students about the American contract law doctrines of the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule (neither of which exist is domestic Taiwanese law). And then back to Taipei to crash.
We took it easy on Tuesday, visiting Soochow University, the Taipei High Court, Freedom Square (site of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial), the Ling Shan (Guandu) Buddhist Temple, and Taipei 101 (currently the world’s tallest completed skyscraper). A fine dinner with Chairman of Taiwan’s Herbal Medicine Committee rounded out the day. (BTW, the Herbal Medicine Committee (www.ccmp.gov.tw) is no joke; it sponsors clinical trials of traditional cures that have led to the issuance of a number of patents.)
Wednesday found our peripatetic lecture group making another presentation, this time at Shih Hsin University. I discussed a framework for integrating intellectual property into the traditional American 1L Property curriculum (largely cribbing from colleague Tom Folsom for this one) as well as the American understanding of (at least real and personal) "property" as a natural, pre-political right. That evening we dined with a number of legal academics from several Taipei law faculties as well Victor Chang, one of Taiwan’s leading advocates.
LaDonna and I toured the Dan Shui River area on our own Thursday morning before leaving for Hong Kong.
The whirlwind? Clearly Mei-Hsin who planed, organized, and executed this excellent opportunity to establish meaningful contacts in Taiwan.
12 May 2009
Long Time No Blog
In the days since I last posted I’ve rushed to end my time in India at NLU and with friends, traveled to Taiwan and Hong Kong, and endured waiting 4+ hours on the tarmac only to have our flight back to the States canceled. But back to the last week of April to recap.
Our last 10 days in India found me wrapping up classes and being honored by the administration and faculty of NLU at a luncheon. I also attended a faculty activity that was new to me: syllabus review. Each faculty reviews his/her syllabus for the upcoming fall classes for the rest of the faculty for comment. The syllabus includes the “modules” of course material, assigned readings (texts and cases), grading breakdown, and dates and types of assessment exercises. The syllabi are presented by PowerPoint slides and orally. It also appeared that mid-level faculty took this opportunity to haze their most junior colleagues. Whether the comments were in good humor I’ll leave to the judgment of the juniors. Such a review should be useful to guarantee sufficient coverage without undue overlap and to ensure that the most up-to-date materials are used.
We were also the guests or hosts for many teas and dinners with the friends we had made in India. The sadness we felt as we prepared to leave was only partially offset by the anticipation of going home. LaDonna made lists of the top ten things she was looking forward to and the ten things she most dreaded about returning to America. Several items, such as our house, appeared on both.
Finally, a special shout out to Garima Dadhich, my Commercial Transactions colleague who joined the faculty only in January. Garima volunteered to drive us and our extensive luggage to the airport (along with the tiny university-hired car). She got a flat for her trouble but it came to our attention before we left the grounds and thankfully NLU’s bus driver was available to install the spare (changing tyres in 43 Celsius weather is not my idea of going-away fun).
Then it off to the Jodhpur airport to Delhi (where the new terminal under construction for the upcoming Commonwealth Games is GREATLY needed) and then a short overnighter to Hong Kong.
29 April 2009
In India, Shadows of Violence Cling to a Politician on the Rise
Narendra Modi, chief minister of Gujarat State, is a candidate in national elections with the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party and India’s most incendiary politician.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/world/asia/29india.html
25 April 2009
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 4
No more Wolterstorff, at least for the foreseeable future. There is much more of worth in Justice including discussions of the rights of animals and inanimate objects such as works of art and the environment. But I will leave such other matters to the pursuit of anyone’s interests my three months of ramblings have piqued.
Pryor on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 1.0
Enough kvetching about Wolterstorff, how can I account for natural human rights? I suggest that Wolterstorff committed an error in his conceptualization of the “property” of the image of God in man (see 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4). Let’s refresh some recollections: per Wolterstorff, “if a right is what is required from another to show due respect for the worth of another human, it must be on account of (i) some property, (ii) some capacity, (iii) some activity, or (iv) some relationship. (319)” (3.2.1)
I agree that (ii) and (iii) don’t work, and I most recently explained why I find Wolterstorff’s configuration of (iv) unpersuasive (3.2.7), so let’s review why Wolterstorff thinks even the “nature-resemblance” formulation of (i) is a dead end. In brief: biblical revelation characterizes human beings as “images of God;” the initial context of the phrase “image of God” and some very limited biblical and post-biblical Hebraic expositions of that phrase tie it to the exercise of dominion; exercise of dominion as God’s images makes people worthy of deep respect; but some people (e.g., our familiar triumvirate of the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative state, and those suffering late-term dementia) cannot exercise dominion and are thus not worthy of respect merely because their “co-species-ists” can; therefore, mere possession of the property of being in the image of God is insufficient to account for natural human rights. I previously recapitulated Wolterstorff’s extended analogy illustrating the flaw of the “nature-resemblance” model of accounting for natural human rights by noting that a “clunker” Mercedes-Benz was still a clunker and worthy of no respect. So too, per Wolterstorff, a "clunker" of a human being. (3.2.4)
But what happens if we change the analogy? Instead of comparing The Human Being to The Car and concluding that the clunkers of neither are worthy of respect, let’s compare the property described as image of God to a fine metal such as gold. A kg of gold is of great worth and generates respect regardless of the shape to which it is formed. To be sure, a Cellini is worth more than its weight in gold but given the choice between the same weight in, say, sawdust, I’ll take the gold, thank you. Instead of limiting the property of image of God to dominion-related capacities, take it as a quality. A quality which, when worked by a Cellini produces something extraordinary but a quality such that even in a “clunker-ed” state is worth a great deal (of respect).
I also think that characterizing the image of God as a qualitative property is more consistent with Wolterstorff’s notion of inherent rights. As we may remember (see 3.2.1), inherent rights inhere by virtue of one’s status. In fact, I would argue that it is the status of human beings as images of God that generates inherent human rights, i.e., the capacity to have rights against God apart from a specific divine grant. (See generally Meredith Kline, Kingdom Prologue [I think; if not there, he asserted it somewhere else] (arguing, against Westminster Confession of Faith 7.1, that God did not “condescend” to enter into covenant with our first human parents because God could not relate to his image bearers but by covenant.)
How could God not respect something in his own image? In other words, the relationship of covenant (including the contingencies of covenant obedience/disobedience and the remedies of covenant blessings/sanctions) account for God’s love for some and condemnation of others; covenant, not love, is basic. And covenant is founded in the status of image of God.
What I have not done is develop a scriptural argument to justify my contentions. Tu quoque, Wolterstorff might say. By way of defense I can only plead the paucity of helpful secondary texts in the NLU library and the scarcity of time as my stay in Jodhpur draws to a close. I’ll let my reader(s) decide if those reasons rise to the level of excuse (see Indian Contract Act, 1871, §56; see also Restatement (Second) Contracts §§ 261 et seq.
I agree that (ii) and (iii) don’t work, and I most recently explained why I find Wolterstorff’s configuration of (iv) unpersuasive (3.2.7), so let’s review why Wolterstorff thinks even the “nature-resemblance” formulation of (i) is a dead end. In brief: biblical revelation characterizes human beings as “images of God;” the initial context of the phrase “image of God” and some very limited biblical and post-biblical Hebraic expositions of that phrase tie it to the exercise of dominion; exercise of dominion as God’s images makes people worthy of deep respect; but some people (e.g., our familiar triumvirate of the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative state, and those suffering late-term dementia) cannot exercise dominion and are thus not worthy of respect merely because their “co-species-ists” can; therefore, mere possession of the property of being in the image of God is insufficient to account for natural human rights. I previously recapitulated Wolterstorff’s extended analogy illustrating the flaw of the “nature-resemblance” model of accounting for natural human rights by noting that a “clunker” Mercedes-Benz was still a clunker and worthy of no respect. So too, per Wolterstorff, a "clunker" of a human being. (3.2.4)
But what happens if we change the analogy? Instead of comparing The Human Being to The Car and concluding that the clunkers of neither are worthy of respect, let’s compare the property described as image of God to a fine metal such as gold. A kg of gold is of great worth and generates respect regardless of the shape to which it is formed. To be sure, a Cellini is worth more than its weight in gold but given the choice between the same weight in, say, sawdust, I’ll take the gold, thank you. Instead of limiting the property of image of God to dominion-related capacities, take it as a quality. A quality which, when worked by a Cellini produces something extraordinary but a quality such that even in a “clunker-ed” state is worth a great deal (of respect).
I also think that characterizing the image of God as a qualitative property is more consistent with Wolterstorff’s notion of inherent rights. As we may remember (see 3.2.1), inherent rights inhere by virtue of one’s status. In fact, I would argue that it is the status of human beings as images of God that generates inherent human rights, i.e., the capacity to have rights against God apart from a specific divine grant. (See generally Meredith Kline, Kingdom Prologue [I think; if not there, he asserted it somewhere else] (arguing, against Westminster Confession of Faith 7.1, that God did not “condescend” to enter into covenant with our first human parents because God could not relate to his image bearers but by covenant.)
How could God not respect something in his own image? In other words, the relationship of covenant (including the contingencies of covenant obedience/disobedience and the remedies of covenant blessings/sanctions) account for God’s love for some and condemnation of others; covenant, not love, is basic. And covenant is founded in the status of image of God.
What I have not done is develop a scriptural argument to justify my contentions. Tu quoque, Wolterstorff might say. By way of defense I can only plead the paucity of helpful secondary texts in the NLU library and the scarcity of time as my stay in Jodhpur draws to a close. I’ll let my reader(s) decide if those reasons rise to the level of excuse (see Indian Contract Act, 1871, §56; see also Restatement (Second) Contracts §§ 261 et seq.
24 April 2009
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.2.7
If God loves a human being with the love of attachment. If God so loves every human being equally and permanently . . . then natural human rights are firmly grounded. Two big “ifs;” how does Wolterstorff account for them?
He doesn’t: “My argument has been hypothetical. . . . I have not argued that God does in fact so love every creature who bears the imago dei.” Well then, what’s Wolterstorff’s point? “I have argued that a grounding of natural human rights is available to the person who holds the theistic convictions indicated.” (360)
Not surprisingly, Wolterstorff himself holds these convictions but his failure to provide any account for them is surprising given his elaborately argued scriptural account for a rights-based understanding of biblical justice (see 1.2 of long ago and Justice at 65-95 and 109-31). In any event, his reticence at this point is disappointing. Many theists of various sorts, including Christian theists, hold Wolterstorff’s position. But at least some do not. Consider the following references to the official doctrinal statements of Christian churches in the Dutch, Reformed tradition: Belgic Confession Arts. 15, 16, and 37 (www.crcna.org/pages/belgic_confess_main.cfm) and the Canons of Dort 1.6, 1.7, 1.10, 1.15 (www.crcna.org/pages/dort_canons_main.cfm).
Perhaps I have misunderstood Wolterstorff. Perhaps the God’s love of attachment is consistent with his reprobation of a certain set of persons. But I don’t think Wolterstorff would agree for on the last page of Justice he writes that the Judaic and Christian heritage “declares that all of us have great and equal worth: the worth of being made in the image of God and of being loved redemptively by God.” (393, emphasis added) Here I take him to be saying that God’s redemptive love (presumably an aspect of his love of attachment) is universally deployed, a contention which strikes me as at odds with the resources cited above.
Perhaps I am still misunderstanding Wolterstorff. Perhaps there is a sense in which God’s love of attachment (including redemptive love) is consistent with God’s reprobation of some. If there is, it isn’t readily apparent to me and if that’s Wolterstorff’s contention I certainly wish he’d suggested an account for it.
He doesn’t: “My argument has been hypothetical. . . . I have not argued that God does in fact so love every creature who bears the imago dei.” Well then, what’s Wolterstorff’s point? “I have argued that a grounding of natural human rights is available to the person who holds the theistic convictions indicated.” (360)
Not surprisingly, Wolterstorff himself holds these convictions but his failure to provide any account for them is surprising given his elaborately argued scriptural account for a rights-based understanding of biblical justice (see 1.2 of long ago and Justice at 65-95 and 109-31). In any event, his reticence at this point is disappointing. Many theists of various sorts, including Christian theists, hold Wolterstorff’s position. But at least some do not. Consider the following references to the official doctrinal statements of Christian churches in the Dutch, Reformed tradition: Belgic Confession Arts. 15, 16, and 37 (www.crcna.org/pages/belgic_confess_main.cfm) and the Canons of Dort 1.6, 1.7, 1.10, 1.15 (www.crcna.org/pages/dort_canons_main.cfm).
Perhaps I have misunderstood Wolterstorff. Perhaps the God’s love of attachment is consistent with his reprobation of a certain set of persons. But I don’t think Wolterstorff would agree for on the last page of Justice he writes that the Judaic and Christian heritage “declares that all of us have great and equal worth: the worth of being made in the image of God and of being loved redemptively by God.” (393, emphasis added) Here I take him to be saying that God’s redemptive love (presumably an aspect of his love of attachment) is universally deployed, a contention which strikes me as at odds with the resources cited above.
Perhaps I am still misunderstanding Wolterstorff. Perhaps there is a sense in which God’s love of attachment (including redemptive love) is consistent with God’s reprobation of some. If there is, it isn’t readily apparent to me and if that’s Wolterstorff’s contention I certainly wish he’d suggested an account for it.
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.2.6
Picking up with my last comments (3.2.5), let’s follow Wolterstorff’s parallel discussion of love. What sort of love is God’s toward humanity? Love as attraction, love as attachment, or love as benevolence? What’s the difference between the three and of what significance might it be?
Love as attraction means that the lover is attracted by the worth of some aspect of the beloved; the lover anticipates being better off by virtue of the relationship. Hardly plausible with respect to a holy God’s love for sinful people. Love as benevolence comes closer to God’s for love humanity but, according to Wolterstorff, love as benevolence usually follows upon love as attraction or love as attachment (one wants to improve that to which one is attracted or attached as the case may be). Love as benevolence thus seems to occupy a secondary place in the order of loves.
The third love, love as attachment, however, is frequently associated with bestowed worth. We cannot account for love as attachment in terms of another form of love (such as love as benevolence) or the lover’s needs (in the case of love as attraction). I think Wolterstorff’s homey example makes this clear. Imagine a stuffed animal that is ugly, “so ugly that it would be hard to find a stuffed animal more ugly.” (359) Yet a child loves it. Why? Simply because this is the one he has bonded with. This is the one to which he is attached. Whatever desires of the child this ugly stuffed animal satisfies it satisfies because of the primary attachment. Similarly, whatever benevolences the child pours upon his stuffed animal arise by virtue of the preexisting attachment. Love as attachment is the affective perspective on the economic principle of bestowed worth.
What is upshot of Wolterstorff’s lengthy analysis? What is the significance of worth and love for human rights? “I conclude that if God loves a human being with the love of attachment, that love bestows great worth on that human being. . . . And I conclude that if God loves, in the mode of attachment, each and every human being equally and permanently, then natural human rights inhere in the worth bestowed on human beings by that love. Natural human rights are what respect for that worth requires.” (360)
Wolterstorff’s two important caveats remain to be considered.
Love as attraction means that the lover is attracted by the worth of some aspect of the beloved; the lover anticipates being better off by virtue of the relationship. Hardly plausible with respect to a holy God’s love for sinful people. Love as benevolence comes closer to God’s for love humanity but, according to Wolterstorff, love as benevolence usually follows upon love as attraction or love as attachment (one wants to improve that to which one is attracted or attached as the case may be). Love as benevolence thus seems to occupy a secondary place in the order of loves.
The third love, love as attachment, however, is frequently associated with bestowed worth. We cannot account for love as attachment in terms of another form of love (such as love as benevolence) or the lover’s needs (in the case of love as attraction). I think Wolterstorff’s homey example makes this clear. Imagine a stuffed animal that is ugly, “so ugly that it would be hard to find a stuffed animal more ugly.” (359) Yet a child loves it. Why? Simply because this is the one he has bonded with. This is the one to which he is attached. Whatever desires of the child this ugly stuffed animal satisfies it satisfies because of the primary attachment. Similarly, whatever benevolences the child pours upon his stuffed animal arise by virtue of the preexisting attachment. Love as attachment is the affective perspective on the economic principle of bestowed worth.
What is upshot of Wolterstorff’s lengthy analysis? What is the significance of worth and love for human rights? “I conclude that if God loves a human being with the love of attachment, that love bestows great worth on that human being. . . . And I conclude that if God loves, in the mode of attachment, each and every human being equally and permanently, then natural human rights inhere in the worth bestowed on human beings by that love. Natural human rights are what respect for that worth requires.” (360)
Wolterstorff’s two important caveats remain to be considered.
23 April 2009
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.2.5
Wolterstorff doesn’t give up the quest for a Christian theistic account for human rights. Before I reconnoiter his proposed account, let’s recall something I wrote a few days ago (3.2.1): “If a right is what is required from another to show due respect for the worth of another human, it must be on account of (i) some property, (ii) some capacity, (iii) some activity, or (iv) some relationship.” Two and three went out the window in 3.2.2 (not all humans have meaningful capacities nor can everyone perform respect-worthy activities) and now Wolterstorff has found (i) wanting as well (by reducing the most plausible understandings of the property of “image of God” into capacity accounts). That leaves him to explore (iv): Is there “some worth-imparting relation of human beings to God that does not in any way involve a reference to human capacities”? (352)
Wolterstorff says there is and that relationship is one that should be familiar to classical economists: it is one of bestowed (or imputed) worth. All human beings are respect-worthy because God loves them.
Before proceeding further, let’s consider Wolterstorff’s example of bestowed worth on a human level, a treasured family relic of a deceased ancestor. Do such relics have instrumental value? Perhaps in some cases but surely the instrumental value of, say, a lock of hair of one’s great-grandmother is difficult to identify. Does such a relic have value because possession of it satisfies some desire on my party? To answer yes is merely to move the discussion one step back: why do I desire this lock of hair? Better, per Wolterstorff, is simply to say that “relics have the value of being such that by treasuring the relic, we honor the person of whom it is the relic.” (358) In other words, Wolterstorff is a classical, not a neo-classical, economist. While desire may create value, the worth of an object varies with its meaning or purpose in a moral and social universe. Worth is indeed imputed but the standard of imputation is not satisfaction of a subjective need or want. (If this doesn’t persuade you, consider applying the desire-fulfillment theory of value to God.)
Wolterstorff says there is and that relationship is one that should be familiar to classical economists: it is one of bestowed (or imputed) worth. All human beings are respect-worthy because God loves them.
Before proceeding further, let’s consider Wolterstorff’s example of bestowed worth on a human level, a treasured family relic of a deceased ancestor. Do such relics have instrumental value? Perhaps in some cases but surely the instrumental value of, say, a lock of hair of one’s great-grandmother is difficult to identify. Does such a relic have value because possession of it satisfies some desire on my party? To answer yes is merely to move the discussion one step back: why do I desire this lock of hair? Better, per Wolterstorff, is simply to say that “relics have the value of being such that by treasuring the relic, we honor the person of whom it is the relic.” (358) In other words, Wolterstorff is a classical, not a neo-classical, economist. While desire may create value, the worth of an object varies with its meaning or purpose in a moral and social universe. Worth is indeed imputed but the standard of imputation is not satisfaction of a subjective need or want. (If this doesn’t persuade you, consider applying the desire-fulfillment theory of value to God.)
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.2.4
Why isn’t belief in human nature rooted in imaging God enough to account for human rights? For the same reason belief in human nature rooted in the capacity for rational agency isn’t enough: it doesn’t matter a hill of beans if someone else has the set of capacities tied by the Hebrew writers to the image of God; if I don’t have them I’m not due the respect that such capacities deserve. To be sure, the dominion-related capacities finding shelter under the umbrella of the image of God are more variegated than the slender pole of rational agency but even so they are no less absent among the triumvirate of the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative state, and those suffering late-term dementia. Dominion-related human nature resembles God but that doesn’t mean every human being does.
But what about the apparent assumption of the ancient Hebrew writers that all human beings partook of the image of God and that all were entitled to the respect that accounts for rights? Doesn’t this imply that even those with profoundly diminished capacities sufficiently resemble God to enjoy respect as his images? Nope, per Wolterstorff: “the biblical writers were not offering generalizations concerning each and every human being; they were describing The Human Being. They had their eye on properly formed and properly functioning human beings.” (352, emphasis added)
If I understand him correctly, Wolterstorff is arguing that possessing the image of God (which is the case with all human beings under the nature-resemblance approach) does not account for the high level respect necessary to support universal human rights. Great respect is due to the high-end car (The Car) if it matches its advertised description; less is due to the same car that misses its described mark; and none at all for the clunker – even a high-end clunker – no matter how beautiful its description. Sure, we’re all made in God’s image but so what? The clunkers among us are still clunkers.
But what about the apparent assumption of the ancient Hebrew writers that all human beings partook of the image of God and that all were entitled to the respect that accounts for rights? Doesn’t this imply that even those with profoundly diminished capacities sufficiently resemble God to enjoy respect as his images? Nope, per Wolterstorff: “the biblical writers were not offering generalizations concerning each and every human being; they were describing The Human Being. They had their eye on properly formed and properly functioning human beings.” (352, emphasis added)
If I understand him correctly, Wolterstorff is arguing that possessing the image of God (which is the case with all human beings under the nature-resemblance approach) does not account for the high level respect necessary to support universal human rights. Great respect is due to the high-end car (The Car) if it matches its advertised description; less is due to the same car that misses its described mark; and none at all for the clunker – even a high-end clunker – no matter how beautiful its description. Sure, we’re all made in God’s image but so what? The clunkers among us are still clunkers.
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.2.3
The diligent among my readers (at least I hope there’s more than one!) might have sensed some foreboding with the final sentence of my last post: “human nature standing alone is too thin a gruel on which to nourish a culture of human rights.” What does it mean for human nature to stand alone? In other words, is having a human nature that images God enough, even though one’s actual status is so severely malformed or so profoundly malfunctioning that one cannot exercise dominion? As Wolterstorff puts it, “suppose one combines the idea of human nature with the idea of resemblance to God in the way in which those ideas are combined in the nature-resemblance construal of image of God. To possess the image of God is to possess a nature such that properly formed possessors of that nature resemble God with respect to their capacities for exercising dominion.” (351)
A very good question to which I would have replied with an insouciant “yes” before reading Wolterstorff further. Wolterstorff’s answer is bluntly contrary: “I do not see that it does.” Here I part company with my guide to justice. (I’ve probably parted company with him on previous occasions without knowing it; maybe an astute reader can point out my lapses.) But before giving my own view let me rehearse Wolterstorff’s critique of the adequacy of the “nature-resemblance construal of image of God” for human rights as well as his proffered alternative.
A very good question to which I would have replied with an insouciant “yes” before reading Wolterstorff further. Wolterstorff’s answer is bluntly contrary: “I do not see that it does.” Here I part company with my guide to justice. (I’ve probably parted company with him on previous occasions without knowing it; maybe an astute reader can point out my lapses.) But before giving my own view let me rehearse Wolterstorff’s critique of the adequacy of the “nature-resemblance construal of image of God” for human rights as well as his proffered alternative.
22 April 2009
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.2.2
Since accounting for the image of God as a set of capabilities fails to ground the concept of human rights, Wolterstorff next suggests tying the image of God to human nature. He notes that many deny that anything – much less human beings – has a nature, at least they do so formally. But everyone, he suspects (and I agree) practices a belief in human nature. If not, why do we all believe that some human beings malfunction? How would know that the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative state, and those suffering late-term dementia are not fully normal if we didn’t believe that they lacked something? To conclude that a person is seriously malformed or profoundly malfunctioning requires a measure and that measure is human nature. “The idea of an organism malfunctioning on account of some malformation requires the idea of that organism having a nature.” (350) Indeed.
Biblical writers were certainly aware that severely malfunctioning human beings existed and could not exercise dominion. Yet they did not conclude that such were not images of God. For this nature-resemblance rejiggering of the image of God to account for human rights, it must be the case that to bear the image of God entails only that one has a nature such that “the mature and properly formed possessors” thereof have the capacity to exercise dominion.
But wait, shout Kant, Dworkin, and Gewirth. Cut us the same slack. Why can’t we be reinterpreted to be claiming only that (i) properly functioning human beings have the capacity for rational agency and (ii) respect (and thus rights) is due to the malfunctioning among us because they too share a human nature that, when properly functioning, can exercise rational agency? In other words, why can’t a secularized version of human nature suffice to ground rights?
In brief, says Wolterstorff, while we can agree that rational agency is surely an admirable capacity for which respect is properly due, why should we respect someone who cannot exercise that capacity just because other members of the species are able to do so? A widespread but not universal capacity to engage in rational conduct doesn’t do those who can’t any good. In short, human nature standing alone is too thin a gruel on which to nourish a culture of human rights.
Biblical writers were certainly aware that severely malfunctioning human beings existed and could not exercise dominion. Yet they did not conclude that such were not images of God. For this nature-resemblance rejiggering of the image of God to account for human rights, it must be the case that to bear the image of God entails only that one has a nature such that “the mature and properly formed possessors” thereof have the capacity to exercise dominion.
But wait, shout Kant, Dworkin, and Gewirth. Cut us the same slack. Why can’t we be reinterpreted to be claiming only that (i) properly functioning human beings have the capacity for rational agency and (ii) respect (and thus rights) is due to the malfunctioning among us because they too share a human nature that, when properly functioning, can exercise rational agency? In other words, why can’t a secularized version of human nature suffice to ground rights?
In brief, says Wolterstorff, while we can agree that rational agency is surely an admirable capacity for which respect is properly due, why should we respect someone who cannot exercise that capacity just because other members of the species are able to do so? A widespread but not universal capacity to engage in rational conduct doesn’t do those who can’t any good. In short, human nature standing alone is too thin a gruel on which to nourish a culture of human rights.
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.2.1
Some analytic distinctions and review: “inherent rights and human rights are not the same.” (317) E.g., certain rights inhere in being a parent (a status) but (the status of) being a parent does not belong to or inhere in being human. Moreover, “natural rights and human rights do not necessarily coincide.” (317) E.g., human rights that do not arise from the nature of being human may be conferred by international convention; conversely, the natural rights of parents are not human rights (because not all humans are or even can be parents).
So: What accounts for attaching certain rights to the status of being human? If a right is what is required from another to show due respect for the worth of another human, it must be on account of (i) some property, (ii) some capacity, (iii) some activity, or (iv) some relationship. (319) Two and three suffer the defect noted in the discussion of Kant, Dworkin, and Gewirth: some folks have them (or can do them), some folks don’t (or can’t). One and four hold out some promise so Wolterstorff starts with (i).
Genesis 1:26-27 and 9:6 — the image of God in man — are the standard starting places for Christian theistic accounting for human rights. But just what is the image of God? Wolterstorff rightly notes that much ink has been spilled elucidating this rather cryptic expression. Drawing from Psalm 8 and Ben Sira 17:3ff, Wolterstorff ties the image of God to the dominion mandate (or blessing). (See my upcoming piece in the McGeorge Law Review again for more on the meaning of “dominion” in this context.) In other words, of all the ways in which human beings might be said to reflect or image God, that set that is “necessary for receiving and exercising the blessing or mandate of dominion” ties together those that are in fact used by ancient Hebrew writers when they expound on the idea of the image of God in man. (347, citing Jeremy Waldron’s God, Locke, and Equality)
But wait: Aren’t we back in the “capacities” conundrum? If the “image of God” is biblical shorthand for a certain, limited set of ways of being in which human beings are like God, what about those humans who simply cannot exercise those ways (e.g., the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative state, and those suffering late-term dementia)? Do they lack the image of God? Have they no human rights? Indeed we are again stuck says Wolterstorff, which means he's off to another, slightly different, interpretation of what it means to be in the image of God to see if it offers better prospects for accounting for human rights.
So: What accounts for attaching certain rights to the status of being human? If a right is what is required from another to show due respect for the worth of another human, it must be on account of (i) some property, (ii) some capacity, (iii) some activity, or (iv) some relationship. (319) Two and three suffer the defect noted in the discussion of Kant, Dworkin, and Gewirth: some folks have them (or can do them), some folks don’t (or can’t). One and four hold out some promise so Wolterstorff starts with (i).
Genesis 1:26-27 and 9:6 — the image of God in man — are the standard starting places for Christian theistic accounting for human rights. But just what is the image of God? Wolterstorff rightly notes that much ink has been spilled elucidating this rather cryptic expression. Drawing from Psalm 8 and Ben Sira 17:3ff, Wolterstorff ties the image of God to the dominion mandate (or blessing). (See my upcoming piece in the McGeorge Law Review again for more on the meaning of “dominion” in this context.) In other words, of all the ways in which human beings might be said to reflect or image God, that set that is “necessary for receiving and exercising the blessing or mandate of dominion” ties together those that are in fact used by ancient Hebrew writers when they expound on the idea of the image of God in man. (347, citing Jeremy Waldron’s God, Locke, and Equality)
But wait: Aren’t we back in the “capacities” conundrum? If the “image of God” is biblical shorthand for a certain, limited set of ways of being in which human beings are like God, what about those humans who simply cannot exercise those ways (e.g., the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative state, and those suffering late-term dementia)? Do they lack the image of God? Have they no human rights? Indeed we are again stuck says Wolterstorff, which means he's off to another, slightly different, interpretation of what it means to be in the image of God to see if it offers better prospects for accounting for human rights.
Mount Abu
Mount Abu, rising over 1200 meters above sea level, has been a center of religious practice and vacation fun for a long time. The (now former) maharajah of Jaipur maintains a summer palace in Mount Abu and it is also the location of the nearly 1000-year old Dilwara Jain temple complex with their spectacular marble carvings. Mount Abu is also the modern home of the international outreach of the Brahma Kumaris "world peace" university. On a mundane level, it's a weekend hangout for Gujaratis who want a brief respite from their officially "dry" state.
We enjoyed the cool nighttime temps, boating on Nakki Lake, seeing the local sights, and observing the spectacular views. A great trip notwithstanding the five hour drive from Jodhpur.
16 April 2009
Third-World Stove Soot Is Target in Climate Fight
Reducing soot from tens of thousands of villages in developing countries is a relatively simple climate fix that scientists say should be pursued immediately.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/science/earth/16degrees.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/science/earth/16degrees.html
14 April 2009
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.1.3
To disrespect a person entails that he or she has non-instrumental worth. But what accounts for human beings having non-instrumental worth? If there is no grounding the belief in non-instrumental human worth, human beings cannot be under-respected. If human beings cannot be under-respected, they cannot be wronged. And if they cannot be wronged, there are no human rights.
Wolterstorff takes his readers on a tour of the leading secular approaches and finds them wanting. Kant and many others attempt to ground human worth or dignity in some capacity human beings have. Kant himself identified the capacity for rational agency as what makes humans worthy. The problem here, as it is for all capacity arguments, is that some humans possess a greater capacity for x (rational agency, etc.) than others and some human don’t have that capacity at all (e.g., the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative state, and those suffering late-term dementia). The approaches of Ronald Dworkin and Alan Gewirth fail for the same reason.
Perhaps, Wolterstorff suggests, someone will yet formulate a workable secular grounding for the worth of human beings but the prospects don’t look good given the firepower already deployed. We can thus give up on a grounded human rights project or go for a theistic account. Wolterstorff pursues the latter.
Wolterstorff takes his readers on a tour of the leading secular approaches and finds them wanting. Kant and many others attempt to ground human worth or dignity in some capacity human beings have. Kant himself identified the capacity for rational agency as what makes humans worthy. The problem here, as it is for all capacity arguments, is that some humans possess a greater capacity for x (rational agency, etc.) than others and some human don’t have that capacity at all (e.g., the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative state, and those suffering late-term dementia). The approaches of Ronald Dworkin and Alan Gewirth fail for the same reason.
Perhaps, Wolterstorff suggests, someone will yet formulate a workable secular grounding for the worth of human beings but the prospects don’t look good given the firepower already deployed. We can thus give up on a grounded human rights project or go for a theistic account. Wolterstorff pursues the latter.
08 April 2009
Wolterstorff on Rights Grounded in Respect of Worth 3.1.2
If rights aren’t boosters, what are they? Citing Ronald Dworkin for coining the phrase, Wolterstorff characterizes rights as trumps. Unlike boosters that add some points to a utilitarian calculation, one who plays the trump card of a right takes the hand: “If I have a right against you to the good of some action on your part, then your performing that action is to take precedence for you over whatever balance of life-good and evils might ensue . . . .” (291)
Well enough. But whence comes this trumping, peremptory significance of a particular claim to a certain action? To our status (or properties, in the Aristotelian sense), replies Wolterstorff. To my status as an employee of Regent University comes my right to my paycheck. From my status as a citizen of the United States of America comes my right to be free from governmental deprivations of life and liberty without due process of law. From my status as a human being . . . well, just what rights come from that, the most fundamental status or property which I possess?
Here Wolterstorff notes a distinction between socially conferred rights and natural (and inherent) rights. For example, the social practice of promising makes sense only if the promisor can invoke the social convention of trust. Invoking trust on the part of the promisee and then reneging is a wrong. Some sorts of this wrong are also legally sanctioned (e.g., a breach of contract) but most by a long shot are not. (My upcoming piece, Principled Pluralism and Contract Remedies, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. __ (2009), discusses this point.) The fact of the wrong, evidenced by the universal feelings of anger, resentment, and the like make clear that a wrong has been committed regardless of the lack of legal consequences. But the presence of a wrong is common in deprivations of natural (however defined) as well as socially conferred rights. To the nature of a wrong we must thus turn.
What is the common denominator of rights? Or, more simply, what makes a wrong? In brief, “to wrong a human being is to treat her in a way that is disrespectful of her worth.” (296) But what’s that? What does it mean to “under-respect” someone? Three things, per Wolterstorff. First, we must presuppose that human beings have non-instrumental worth. If they did not, then we would be back to the utilitarian calculus that entails the non-existence of rights. Second, wrongs presuppose that certain (in)actions can have a “respect-disrespect” import. To say otherwise would deny human agency and, similarly, deny the existence of rights. Third, the respect-disrespect import of human actions can be out of accord with the non-instrumental worth of another. In other words, under certain conditions one can act in such a way as not to respect the worth of someone else; we can wrong him.
Well enough. But whence comes this trumping, peremptory significance of a particular claim to a certain action? To our status (or properties, in the Aristotelian sense), replies Wolterstorff. To my status as an employee of Regent University comes my right to my paycheck. From my status as a citizen of the United States of America comes my right to be free from governmental deprivations of life and liberty without due process of law. From my status as a human being . . . well, just what rights come from that, the most fundamental status or property which I possess?
Here Wolterstorff notes a distinction between socially conferred rights and natural (and inherent) rights. For example, the social practice of promising makes sense only if the promisor can invoke the social convention of trust. Invoking trust on the part of the promisee and then reneging is a wrong. Some sorts of this wrong are also legally sanctioned (e.g., a breach of contract) but most by a long shot are not. (My upcoming piece, Principled Pluralism and Contract Remedies, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. __ (2009), discusses this point.) The fact of the wrong, evidenced by the universal feelings of anger, resentment, and the like make clear that a wrong has been committed regardless of the lack of legal consequences. But the presence of a wrong is common in deprivations of natural (however defined) as well as socially conferred rights. To the nature of a wrong we must thus turn.
What is the common denominator of rights? Or, more simply, what makes a wrong? In brief, “to wrong a human being is to treat her in a way that is disrespectful of her worth.” (296) But what’s that? What does it mean to “under-respect” someone? Three things, per Wolterstorff. First, we must presuppose that human beings have non-instrumental worth. If they did not, then we would be back to the utilitarian calculus that entails the non-existence of rights. Second, wrongs presuppose that certain (in)actions can have a “respect-disrespect” import. To say otherwise would deny human agency and, similarly, deny the existence of rights. Third, the respect-disrespect import of human actions can be out of accord with the non-instrumental worth of another. In other words, under certain conditions one can act in such a way as not to respect the worth of someone else; we can wrong him.
Outsourcing Motherhood
The booming surrogacy industry in India:
http://www.livemint.com/2009/04/08100243/Poverty-makes-surrogates-of-wo.html?h=A1
http://www.livemint.com/2009/04/08100243/Poverty-makes-surrogates-of-wo.html?h=A1
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