(For Parts 1, 2, and 3 of my comments on The Davenant Trust’s Convivium
Irenicum 2016 go here,
here,
and here.)
What is hypothetical universalism (HU)? And what do the Reformed
confessions and theologians have to say about it? There were the subjects of
Michael Lynch’s paper. The original answer to the first questions is
straightforward. Peter Lombard’s pithy aphorism sums up HU: Christ’s death is
sufficient for all but efficient only for the elect. But what does it mean to
say Christ’s death is “sufficient for all”? And, for those who subscribe to the
Westminster standards, is there any sense in which “sufficient for all” can be
cabined so as to remain consistent with those standards?
Lynch carefully worked his way through the post-Westminster
arguments in England that pitted Richard Baxter against William Cunningham in
their disputations over the meaning of Westminster Confession of Faith 3.8,
8.5, and 8.8. Perhaps my lack of focus on the details of the debate says more
about me than the importance of the issue. In any event, some form of HU is consistent
with the WCF but it’s not precisely clear how it should be stated.
Like many before him and surely more to follow, Paul Nidelisky
took a shot at answering the question of the relationship between a strong
doctrine of God’s providence and the meaning of free will. Nidelisky had the
advantage(?) of not being a theologian and approached the issue as an analytic
philosopher of metaphysics. His first of three points—and one with which I
fully concur—is to define “free will” in terms of a power. In other words, my
will is free so long as I have the power to do otherwise even though I will
never actualize that power apart from God’s providential decree. (The so-called
irrefragability of Christ’s bones is the prototypical biblical example.)
Moving the argument another step down the chain of how God brings his decrees to fruition
in human affairs is more problematic. Nidelisky took the position that God so decrees
all of the multiple contingencies of each person’s life that she will
inevitably choose in accordance with his decree with respect to matters in the
domain of the will. While not entirely clear how this differs from Molinism, Nidelisky
contended that it did. In any, his too was a working paper so we can all look
forward to the published version to learn how Nedilisky works out all the multitude
of perplexing details.
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