Unusual Approaches to Protecting (Religious) Liberty - Part 2

The other day I posted here about a modified Rawlsian approach to religious liberty, particularly as it pertains to the right of an "illiberal" community (religious or otherwise) to educate its children according to its illiberal tenets. By including the reality of community socialization to penetrate behind Rawls's "veil of ignorance," Mark Rosen's article increased the protection of conscience of those he calls "Perfectionists" in the liberal state. Nonetheless, Rosen's approach continues to infringe on the liberty of conscience of even Local Perfectionists who, as illiberals, are nonetheless required to stipulate to the moral legitimacy of the liberal state. And, as I understand Rosen, this conscientious objection to any sort of a liberal political establishment--even one that tolerates Local Perfectionists--is not something that could be taught within the illiberal community's schools.

Today I will merely suggest another, more radical approach, that of Abner Greene in his book Against Obligation: The Multiple Sources of Authority in a Liberal Democracy (Harvard University Press 2012). This will be a mere suggestion because I haven't read the book although you can read its abstract here. Since I can't summarize something I've not read, I'll simply quote from Greene's abstract:

I argue that citizens do not have even a prima facie moral duty to obey the law just because it’s the law, even in a liberal democracy. I cover arguments for political obligation that one might call agent-centered (consent, duty of fair play, and political participation), status-based (natural duty, associative obligation), and state-centered (consequentialist arguments from systemic stability). (Emphasis added. Apparently Greene doesn't address religiously-derived moral obligations to obey the law, e.g., Romans 13.1-17.)

Quite a thesis, eh? I'm awaiting the book to see how Greene pulls it off. But more to my point, that of religious liberty. Greene's abstract goes on to state that

The idea that all of our sources of value, and of duty, should be considered presumptively on par with each other, including value and duty based in the law. From the challenge to political obligation and the case for permeable sovereignty, I elaborate the claim that the state should accommodate our religious and other norms whenever possible.

Sphere sovereignty (glance here) on steroids! How this would play out for Rosen's Universal Perfectionists remains to be seen but I'll let you know when I find out.