A few days ago I posted some initial comments on Chapter 1 (Reimagining the Self) of Carl Trueman's book Rise and Triumph of the Modern Self. Chapter 2 (Reimagining Our Culture) is too short to do justice to the scope of Trueman's argument. I largely agree with the broad contours of two of his conclusions: first, that the culture of the modern West is "third-world" in Philip Rieff's sense that it does not purport to be justified by the sacred. Second, drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre, that its practical ethics have reduced to emotivism. But Trueman's third argument, that modern West is antihistorical, is too broadly framed. With some clarifications, however, I believe I can restate it in a way that makes it more accurate. I will limit my comments to the first two of Trueman's points in this post.
Chapter 2 begins with another warning against idea-based worldview-ism:
[Charles Taylor's] idea of the social imaginary is useful in highlighting the fact that most of us do not self-consciously reflect on life and the world as we live in it but instead think and act intuitively in accordance with the way we instinctively imagine the world to be. [In turn], that view is shaped by the environment in which we live ...
Trueman then turns to Rieff's classification of cultures into three types: first and second cultural worlds are those in which the interdicts of morality depend on something transcendent, whether an inscrutable Fate whose dictates are derived from myth (first world) or a revelation from God (second world). Notwithstanding a transcendent source of moral order, there would still be plenty of battles over the content of morality derived from the stories of a distant past or from competing interpretations of sacred revelations. In other words, neither first- nor second-world morality is free from conflict. It remains the case, however, that there was a common belief in a sacred order behind or beyond the contemporary culture of either of the two worlds. For better and worse, denizens of particular first and second worlds believe there are more or less correct answers to ethical questions and can appeal to a common source to answer such questions.
Third worlds, in Rieff's taxonomy, "do not root their cultures, their social order, their moral imperatives in anything sacred." Instead, they justify themselves on "the basis of themselves." (76) In Charles Taylor's turn of phrase, third worlds are enclosed in an immanent frame. The effect on the mode or moral reasoning is substantial: "The culture with no sacred order therefor has the task ... of justifying itself only by reference to itself. Morality will thus tend toward a matter of simple consequentialist pragmatism." (77) Law-and-economics, perhaps the dominant mode of contemporary legal theory in the U.S., exemplifies the turn toward the pragmatic. Indeed, much of what passes for political conservatism in America is in thrall to the market and its efficiencies, demonstrating a foundation in a pragmatic, third-world social imaginary.
Trueman's use of Rieff's taxonomy is initially helpful as a descriptive matter but he goes on to deploy it uncritically. Sounding worldview-ish, Trueman asserts that "there is no common ground on which the denizens of third worlds can engage in meaningful dialogue with those of the first or second." (80) I'm not familiar enough with Rieff to know whether Trueman is applying him correctly although I think that Christopher Lasch does a good job of taking the insights of Rieff and developing them without the latter's Freudian subtext.*
Trueman begins using Alasdair MacIntyre in Chapter 2. Trueman deploys Macintyre for MacIntyre's use of the term "emotivism" to describe contemporary practical ethics (moral judgments are "nothing but" expressions of preference, attitude, or feeling) and MacIntyre's relentless efforts to restore the importance of teleology (and hence the virtues) to ethical theory. Although not mentioned by Trueman, the revitalization of virtue ethics is a real deal in today's secular academy. See, for example, the work of legal scholars Larry Solum and Nate Oman.
Emotivism is also the real deal in social theory:
It is important to distinguish between emotivism as a moral theory and emotivism as a social theory. The former is very flimsy. Few, if any of us, are likely to argue that our own moral views are simply based on our emotional preferences. But the latter seems today to offer a good way of understanding how most people actually live their lives. (87)
In other words, emotivism is not an element of anyone's worldview but it is a significant aspect of the social imaginary for many. And next time, my thoughts on Trueman on Rieff on the use of history.
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* For a brief introduction see Chapter 12 ("Philip Rieff and the Religion of Culture") in Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites (Norton 1995).
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